The biological basis of the commonality in color lexicons across languages has been hotly debated for decades. Prior evidence that infants categorize color could provide support for the hypothesis that color categorization systems are not purely constructed by communication and culture. Here, we investigate the relationship between infants' categorization of color and the commonality across color lexicons, and investigate the potential biological origin of infant color categories. We systematically mapped infants' categorical recognition memory for hue onto a stimulus array used previously to document the color lexicons of 110 non-industrialized languages. Following familiarization to a given hue, infants' response to a novel hue indicated that their recognition memory parses the hue continuum into red, yellow, green, blue and purple categories. Infants' categorical distinctions aligned with common distinctions in color lexicons, and are organized around hues that are commonly central to lexical categories across languages. The boundaries between infants' categorical distinctions also aligned, relative to the adaptation point, with the cardinal axes that describe the early stages of color representation in retinogeniculate pathways, indicating that infant color categorization may be partly organized by biological mechanisms of color vision. The findings suggest that color categorization in language and thought is partially biologically constrained, and have implications for broader debate on how biology, culture and communication interact in human cognition.
Main Text
The extent to which cognition is biologically 'hardwired' has been hotly debated (1) (2) (3) (4) . Color cognition has provided a fertile testing ground for such debate. One key question has been the origin of color terms and their categories. Although the spectrum of color is continuous, humans typically refer to colors with a number of discrete terms (e.g., red, green, blue). Some have argued that how terms categorize the continuum of color and how color lexicons evolve is biologically constrained (5, 6) , others have argued that color terms and their categories are culturally and linguistically constructed (7) . Cognitive scientists from a broad range of disciplines (e.g., linguistics, neuroscience, vision science, anthropology, developmental science) have been working for decades to understand how color terms and their categories form. These efforts have established that although the color lexicons of the world's languages vary in the number of color terms and in how they parse the continuum of color, there is also striking commonality across languages and evidence for 'universal' constraints (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) . For example, in the World Color Survey (WCS), speakers of 110 non-industrialized languages named 320 colors (13) , and analyses have shown that the centers of the categories denoted by these languages' color terms cluster around particular hues (8) . These particular hue regions also appear to be central to the color categories of industrialized languages (e.g., English), and are commonly the location of the 'focal' best examples of color terms (10) . The organizing principles for this common categorization structure have been sought, and computational models have suggested a number of sources such as the chromatic structure of natural scene statistics (14) chromatic discrimination thresholds (15) or 'near-optimal partitioning' mechanisms based on basic principles of categorization (9) . There has also been a hunt for neurons which encode color categorically in regions of the visual cortex and early ventral stream (16) (17) (18) .
Although we do not yet have solid evidence for the neural basis of commonalities and 'universal' constraints in color naming, further impetus for the idea that color terms and categories have a biological basis has come from studies with infants (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) . Converging evidence suggests that pre-linguistic infants as young as four-months old respond categorically to color. Many of the infant studies have relied on the 'novelty preference' method that has been used to demonstrate that categorization is a domain-general and fundamental aspect of infant cognition (28). Infants are familiarized to a given hue through repeated presentation (until infant looking at the hue wanes) and a novel hue is then presented during a test phase. If infants look longer at a novel than familiar hue at test (a novelty preference) then infants are deemed to distinguish the two hues in their recognition memory. Studies have shown that infant recognition memory appears to distinguish hues that are differentiated by certain lexical distinctions (e.g., blue-green), and infant recognition memory treats hues within these lexical categories as if they are equivalent (e.g., no novelty preference). This 'same-category' equivalence in recognition memory has been found even when hues within a lexical category are well above infants' chromatic discrimination thresholds when measured with simple detection tasks (24, 25), and when hue differences are maximized (24). Infants' responses therefore fit the classic definition of categorization: 'responding in an equivalent manner to discriminably different stimuli' (29, pg 52). Evidence for a categorical response in infant recognition memory for hue has also been provided using neuroimaging methods, such as event related potentials (22), and near infra-red spectroscopy (27).
Infants' apparent categorization of color suggests that color categorization may have a biological origin. Of course, lexical color categories cannot be completely biologically determined since color lexicons vary across languages both in the number of color terms and in the location of lexical color boundaries. Communication needs, and cultural and environmental forces are inevitably valuable in explaining the evolution of a color lexicon within a culture (29). However, it is possible that lexical color categories are partly rooted in the underlying mechanisms of the early visual system that code for color. This partial constraint could potentially explain the commonality in categorization structure across the world's languages, such as the clustering of categories around particular regions of color (8) or the common category 'motifs' that are seen across languages (10).
Although it is theoretically possible that color categories have biological roots, the current evidence of a categorical response to color in infancy is insufficient for a full endorsement of this theory. First, the majority of the evidence for a categorical response to color in infants comes from testing a few color categories that are defined by their lexical distinction in English (e.g., blue-green and blue-purple). The full continuum of hue has not been tested and so categorical distinctions may have been missed. This means that, although there is converging evidence that infants respond categorically to color, the number and location of infant color category boundaries is not currently known.
A more complete characterization of infant color categorization is needed to clarify the relationship between infants' categorical response and lexical color categories. One possibility is that the way in which infant categories divide up the hue continuum is highly similar to the structure of color lexicons. An alternative possibility is that infants' categorical response is a quirk of a few limited regions of color space, and that it has little resemblance to more comprehensive categorization systems seen in language. Infant color categories could align with those of specific languages, for example, lexicons of industrialized languages that have a greater number of basic terms than lexicons of non-industrialized languages. However, we consider it more likely that infant color categories would align not with any one language in particular, but rather with the categorization structure that is common across the world's languages, since it is this commonality that potentially suggests some form of biological constraint. For example, one hypothesis is that infant color categories are organized around the hues that Kay and Regier (8) have revealed to be commonly at the centers of the categories of the WCS.
A second reason why there is currently insufficient evidence for the theory that color categorization has biological origins is that the underlying mechanisms of infant color categorization have not been systematically investigated. Infant categories, at least at 4-months, are unlikely to have communication or cultural origins, but they are not necessarily rooted in the biological mechanisms of the visual system. It is often assumed that the presence of infant categorization is evidence of a biologically determined 'innateness', yet infants also have a remarkable ability to learn categories by tuning into the statistical regularities present in stimulus exemplars (30). Environmental origins of color categories have been proposed (e.g. (13) and it is at least theoretically possible that infants are able to tune into the statistical regularities and structure of their chromatic environment in order to extract a categorization structure (22). Another possibility is that infants' color categorization is based on 'nearoptimal' partitioning of the color spectrum as has been argued for lexical categorization (9), with infants also applying basic principles of categorization (31) to an uneven perceptual color space.
When Berlin and Kay (5) first discovered the regularity in the evolution of color terms across color lexicons, it was proposed that color categories had a biological basis. However, subsequent investigation of the retinogeniculate cone-opponent pathways of the visual system that underpin the early encoding of color has revealed that these pathways do not encode the 'basic' white, black, red, green, blue and yellow categories (and the perceptually pure 'unique'
hues of these categories) as originally proposed (32). What are commonly known as the 'redgreen' and 'blue-yellow' cardinal cone-opponent mechanisms are actually better described as 'cherry-teal' and 'chartreuse-violet' in terms of the appearance of the colors they encode. The idea that the cardinal mechanisms can explain the commonality in color categorization across languages such as good examples (focals) and perceptually pure examples (unique hues) of color has therefore been largely dismissed. Nevertheless, there has been some recent tentative evidence for a link between the early color mechanisms and color categorization from a study that concluded that the 'red-green' cone-opponent mechanism accounted for the common 'warm-cool' category distinction that arises from analysis of WCS naming data (33). It is theoretically possible that infants are able to draw on cone-opponent mechanisms in a similar way in order to categorize colors. Evidence that infant color categorization is related to the cardinal axes of color vision would be strong support for the theory that color categorization has biological origins.
The current investigation had three aims: First, to establish the hue categories that infants have;
Second, to establish the relationship between infant color categories and adult color lexicons;
Third, to identify the underlying mechanisms of infant color categorization and whether infant categories are related to the cardinal cone-opponent mechanisms that underlie early coding of color. Together, the findings aim to shed light on whether color categorization has biological origins that partially constrain the formation of color categories within a language.
In order to address these aims, we mapped infant categories onto the hue circle using the stimulus array from the WCS. We systematically sampled colors from a row of the WCS stimulus grid. Within this row, hues span the hue circle, are at constant lightness and at varying chroma (similar to saturation or colorfulness). We sampled colors at regular hue intervals that we predicted, on the basis of infant chromatic thresholds would be large enough to be discriminated at 4-6 months (34). We confirmed in an additional experiment that the colors are discriminable at 4-6 months and that the findings of the current experiment are not related simply to the perceptual similarity of the colors (see Fig S1) . In the current experiment, we used the novelty preference method to look for hue pairs that are distinguished in infant recognition memory, and for hue pairs for which there is no novelty preference despite being discriminable in other contexts. As a second test, we also tested three larger hue pairs which straddled two or more smaller hue pairs to confirm whether or not hues in that region were distinguished in infant recognition memory when chromatic differences were larger. Regions where infants appear to treat hues as if equivalent are identified as being from one hue category, and regions where infants distinguish hues are identified as being categorically distinct. figure 1A ). The other 9
pairs showed firm support for H0 (all B<1/3, weakest probability of H0 was for pair 7.5GY-5G, where t=1.88, p =.07, B=0. 19 ). Infants were also tested on three more widely separated stimulus pairs which spanned several of the original pairs (three larger pairs within green, blue, red/yellow). There was firm support for H1 for the large red/yellow pair (7.5RP-10Y, columns 38-12), t (9) =2.84, p=.02, B=6.30E+00 and for H0 for the larger hue differences within green (7.5GY-2.5BG, columns 24-30) or blue (10BG-5PB, columns 15-21), (largest t=1.34, smallest p=0.21, largest B=0.17). We identify stimulus 10Y, 2.5Y and 7.5GY as 'yellow' here due to Munsell hue notation, although at the munsell value sampled, these hues are darker than prototypical yellow. This issue is returned to in the Discussion. Distinctions infants make between green-yellow, blue-purple, purple-red, and red-yellow hues appear to provide fault lines that separate the centroid peaks from each other (Fig SI 3) . Infants' distinction between blue-green hues does not fit so well with this pattern, since although it separates the centroid peaks at blue and green, it also spans a region of high centroid counts from WCS languages which have composite blue-green 'grue' terms. Analysis of the number of category centroids for hues that were straddled by each pair, identified that the particular combination of 5 pairs for which infants had novelty preference spanned hues with fewer centroids than 4.27% of any other combination of 5 pairs from the pairs tested (SI Analysis of WCS Centroids). This suggests that hue pairs which are categorically different for infants are in regions which are infrequently at the center of lexical categories and that infant color categories are optimally organized around hues which are commonly central to lexical color categories: fewer than 5% of other 5 pair combinations are better organized.
Underlying mechanisms of infants' response. To test the hypothesis that infant color
categorization is related to the cardinal mechanisms of color vision we plotted, using reflectance spectra taken from the University of Joensuu Color Group database 
Discussion
Converging evidence from prior research suggests that infants respond categorically to color.
However, since the full hue circle has not been previously tested, the number and location of categorical hue distinctions were unknown. Therefore, the relationship between infant color categories and those of the world's color lexicons, and the underlying mechanism of infant color categories have been unclear. In order to address these issues, we systematically mapped infants' novelty preference responses onto a row of the WCS stimulus grid. Infants successfully familiarized to a given hue, and when presented subsequently with a novel hue, infants had a novelty preference for five pairs of hues in red-yellow, green-yellow, blue-green, blue-purple and purple-red regions of color space. There was also firm evidence for a lack of novelty response within the hue regions of blue, green, purple, yellow and red. The lack of a novelty response within purple, blue and green regions was found even when the largest hue differences spanning pairs that lacked a novelty response were tested.
As noted earlier, we use the term 'yellow' to denote stimuli in the yellowish region of the hue continuum following the Munsell hue notation. However, stimuli were sampled at constant lightness close to the lightness of the prototypes of other hues but darker than prototypical yellow. The dark and non-prototypical nature of the stimuli in the yellow region may account for why there was much more individual variation for the less widely separated red-yellow and green-yellow pairs than most other pairs (more infants had to be tested on these pairs for a sensitive Bayes factor), and the novelty preference effect was weakest for the red-yellow pair.
Testing these hues at prototypical lightness levels would confirm this. Nevertheless, whatever the appropriate gloss for the yellowish hues (and this would obviously vary across languages), the current study identifies a categorical distinction for infants in this region.
An additional experiment and further analysis ruled out the hypothesis that novelty preferences were simply related to perceptual similarity and confirmed that colors can be discriminated in other contexts (see SI Discrimination and Novelty Preference). The findings therefore suggest that infants' recognition memory is categorical: some colors are treated as if they are equivalent in infants' recognition memory, yet others which are not always more perceptually dissimilar are treated as if they are different. Overall, our findings suggest that infant memory parses the hue continuum at the lightness level tested into five categories: red, yellow, green, blue and purple. Prior research has provided evidence that infants' recognition memory parses color into blue, green (19, 20, 22, 23) and purple (23) categories, with a suggestion of separate red and yellow categories as well (19) . Unlike prior studies, we systematically sampled at regular intervals around the complete hue circle, providing the first evidence that infant memory also distinguishes purple and red.
Relationship to lexical color categories. Mapping infant categories onto the WCS stimulus grid clarifies the relationship between infant color categories and lexical color categorization.
Correspondences between the location of infants' categorical distinctions and those in color lexicons can be seen. In particular, the common green-blue-purple naming motif that was Underlying mechanisms. We found no evidence that infants' novelty preference is driven by how perceptually similar hues are. However, when infants' novelty response was plotted in a color space defined by the cardinal color sub-systems that correspond to the retinogeniculate pathways underlying color vision, we see for the first time that four of the categorical distinctions that infants make are separated by axes in this color space that pass through the chromaticity of the background, which could be considered the 'adaptation point'. We propose therefore that the null points of the two cardinal subsystems of color vision provide boundaries that infants may use to parse the color continuum into categories in their recognition memory.
This of course cannot account for infants' categorical distinction between red and yellowwhich must derive from alternative mechanisms.
Our proposal that the cardinal color mechanisms provide fault lines for infant color categorization is related to similar arguments made about adult color naming. For example, one study of adult color naming and hue settings provides evidence that the cardinal axes align with adults' blue-green and yellow-green category boundaries (45) . Another study suggests that The lack of one-to-one mapping between pre-linguistic and lexical color categorization may well partly explain the difficulty that children have in learning the words for colors (49) (50) (51) (52) .
Further research should also examine whether the distinctions in infant color memory are 'universal' across different cultures and environments. Given the link to the cardinal mechanisms of color vision we expect them to be largely consistent across cultures, but cultural variation in pre-linguistic categorization is at least theoretically possible.
To conclude, we find that infant recognition memory parses the hue circle into blue, green, purple, yellow and red categories, and we find similarity in the structure of pre-linguistic and lexical color categorization. The retinogeniculate mechanisms of color vision appear to provide fault lines for infants' categorical distinctions between hues. Our findings provide further evidence that color categorization has biological origins. Our results also relate to broader debate on the biological origins of aspects of cognition such as knowledge about the physical world, mathematical ability and spatial cognition (2) . Although certain cognitive processes may seem to a large extent to be culturally or linguistically constructed due to apparent linguistic and cultural diversity, by looking at commonalities across cultures and languages, and by investigating these cognitive processes in infancy, biological origins of cognitive processes can also be revealed. 
Methods

Supplementary information
Discrimination and novelty preference
The definition of categorization is that 'discriminable stimuli are treated equivalently' (p. 52, Quinn, 2003) . One possibility is that a lack of a novelty preference could indicate that infants cannot actually see the difference between colors rather than indicate that infants can discriminate the colors but treat them equivalent in memory. We predicted, on the basis of a study of infant chromatic thresholds (34) , that all chromatic differences should be discriminable for infants since all chromatic differences were larger than the average chromatic discrimination threshold at 4-months (threshold estimated to be 21∆E units in CIELAB color space (34): the smallest difference in the current study was 28∆E and the average was 62.38 ∆E for the smaller pairs and 109.47 for the larger pairs. However, there are difficulties in inferring discriminability from other studies which used different stimuli (e.g., Knoblauch's estimates were for chromatic differences from neutral along protan, deutan and tritan axes, and the threshold estimates also had a good deal of variability). In addition, even if all chromatic differences were above chromatic thresholds, it is possible that those stimuli with novelty preferences are more perceptually dissimilar. Therefore, in order to further understand the relationship between discrimination, perceptual similarity and novelty preference we take two approaches. First, we investigated the relationship between infants' novelty preferences and the similarity of colors by testing whether the size of color differences in a perceptual color space and adult similarity ratings of the colors predicted infants' novelty preferences. Second, we made additional measurements which directly tested infant discrimination of four of the color pairs (two with novelty preferences and two without) to check that colors which failed to elicit a novelty preference could be discriminated in other contexts, and to assess the relationship between discriminability and novelty preference.
Measurements of discrimination and perceptual similarity for stimulus pairs
We tested discrimination and perceptual similarity using a target detection task developed by
Franklin, Pilling and Davies (25). In our target detection task a colored target is seen on a colored background and eye-movements are recorded with an eye-tracker to measure how well infants can discriminate the target from the background. Low-pass luminance noise was added so that the target could only be detected on the basis of the chromatic difference of target and background and not on the basis of luminance (colors were isoluminant for the average adult observer which is a good estimate of infant isoluminance (54)). The task was also made to be gaze-contingent such that a visual and auditory reward was played when the target was fixated and the next trial commenced automatically following target fixation (as in 55) . Four stimulus pairs were tested from green-yellow and purple-red regions. For both regions, two adjacent pairs were sampled, one pair with a novelty preference and one without. We check whether these pairs, which include two of the smallest chromatic differences (in CIELAB), can be discriminated in the context of the target detection task, and compare the perceptual similarity of the color pairs.
Of course, if infants can discriminate the colors in the context of the target detection task it does not necessarily indicate that they can be discriminated when seen in the context of the novelty preference task as the spatial characteristics of the task differ. As the stimulus pairs in the target detection are abutting as figure and ground, this could lower discrimination thresholds on the task relative to the test phase of the novelty preference task where the two different stimuli were surrounded by a neutral ground. Unfortunately, in infants it is not possible to measure discrimination of two stimuli using looking measures when the stimuli are shown side by side on a neutral ground as in the novelty preference task but without a familiarization phase. Infants may look longer at one stimulus than the other which would indicate discrimination, but may not have a looking preference and still be able to discriminate them (e.g., be able to discriminate blue and red but look at them equally). However, the target detection task does provide a measure of relative perceptual similarity across the color pairs. If novelty preferences are based on how different colors look rather than their categorical relationship, then the pairs for which there were novelty preferences should have greater target fixation than the pairs with no novelty preference.
Methods
Participants. Twelve 4-6 month old infants took part, with 2 infants excluded due to infant fussiness. The final sample (8 males) had a mean age of 22.63 weeks (SD 2.65). All infants had a birth weight greater than 2500g and no known visual or neurological conditions.
Apparatus and Stimuli. There were four stimulus pairs, sampled from the main experiment from green-yellow (2.5Y-10Y; 10Y-7.5GY) and blue-purple regions (2. initial point of fixation (55) . If infant gaze strayed from the screen, the trial was discounted, a looming and contracting black and white attention getter was displayed centrally and the next trial was onset once the attention getter was fixated. In addition to the four stimulus pairs from the novelty preference task, and a condition where the target and background were the same color (7.5 B) in order to estimate chance performance on the task. The allocation of each color in a stimulus pair as target or background was counterbalanced, and trial order was randomized.
Trials continued until infant looking at the screen waned or until a maximum of 120 trials had been completed.
Results and Discussion
The percentage of trials where the target was fixated was calculated for the four green-yellow and purple-red stimulus pairs (hit rate), and the condition where target and background were identical (guess rate). SI figure 4 gives the guess rate and the hit rates for the four pairs Bayesian paired samples t-tests (with a Cauchy prior of 0.707) revealed that for all four pairs the target was fixated at a rate greater than chance, meaning that all four color pairs were preferences are unlikely to be simply related to perceptual similarity since targets for color pairs with greater novelty preference were not always fixated at a greater rate than color pairs with no novelty preference.
In sum, we show here that infants' novelty preferences are unlikely to be due to discriminability or perceptual similarity as: i) all color differences were above estimated average chromatic thresholds; ii) novelty preferences do not relate to chromatic differences in perceptual color space, and iii) chromatic differences which failed to elicit a novelty preference are discriminable in other contexts and not always detected more readily than chromatic differences with a novelty preference. We therefore suggest that infants' pattern of novelty preference indicates that infant color memory is governed by the categorical relationship of the colors.
The current study demonstrates that color categories affect infant hue memory. Another question is whether color categories themselves affect perception (categorical perception, (25).
That question is different to the one addressed in the target detection experiment outlined above. The experiment above seeks to obtain a measure of perceptual similarity to see whether perceptual similarity rather than categories can account for infants' novelty preferences. An experiment that tested categorical perception would need to instead equate same-and differentcategory chromatic differences in discrimination and see whether categories affect perceptual similarity. Franklin et al. found that colored target detection was faster when on different-than same-category colored backgrounds, when the chromatic differences were equated in CIE perceptual color space (25). However, as discussed above, it is an assumption that adult and infant perceptual color spaces are similar, and equating stimuli in discrimination rather than perceptual similarity would be more logical for testing categorical perception. One approach which may clarify whether color categories affect infant perceptual similarity would be to equate same-and different-category color differences in the number of just-noticeable differences and then test whether the categorical status affects target detection when chromatic differences are suprathreshold. This approach was adopted by (47) to investigate the time course of color category effects in adults, and when colors were equated in just noticeable differences (JNDs), color categories affected post-perceptual processing around 200 ms from stimulus onset. Now that the current investigation has identified infants' categorical distinctions, the approach taken by He et al. can be applied to infants.
A-priori preference
Infants have a-priori preferences for looking longer at some hues (e.g., reds and blues) than others (e.g., yellow-greens) (e.g., 56-59). The current study controlled for such a-priori preferences by counterbalancing across infants which stimulus was novel for each pair of stimuli. Due to this counterbalancing, preference for a certain hue (e.g., blue) is unlikely to account for novelty preference for a stimulus pair (e.g., blue and green) as half of the infants saw a given hue as the novel color and half as the familiar hue -when novelty preference is averaged across infants the effect of any a-priori preferences should cancel out (60). Mean novelty preferences were in fact highly similar irrespective of which stimulus in each pair was novel and which was familiar: the discrepancy in novelty preference was on average only 5%.
In addition, a-priori preferences are unlikely to account for novelty preferences as a-priori hue preference in infants varies smoothly with hue and therefore two similar hues are unlikely to elicit a large difference in looking times (59). An analysis was conducted to confirm that apriori preferences could not account for variation in novelty preference across stimulus pairs. 
Analysis of WCS centroids
To investigate the hypothesis that infant color categories are organized around hues that are commonly central to lexical categories, we conducted an analysis using the WCS naming centroids (the number of times that the hue is at the center of a WCS lexical category when plotted in a perceptual color space (CIELAB)). If infant color categories do capture the common centers of lexical categories revealed by the WCS, then the hue pairs which are categorically different for infants (indicated by pairs with novelty preference) should span hues which are infrequently at the centers of lexical categories (i.e. coincide infrequently with category centroids when counted across WCS languages). We investigated whether the combination of 5 pairs for which we find novelty preference optimally avoids category centroids (centroid frequencies were taken from ref 8). We consider the 13 adjacent stimuli pairs from row G, hue columns: (3, 6) , (6, 9) , (9, 12) , (12, 15) , (15, 18) , (18, 21) , (21,24), (24,27), A simple means to quantitatively assess how well the infant preferences align with the WCS naming centroids is to assign a score to this particular configuration: the total number of centroids between the 5 stimuli pairs (excluding the stimuli column centroid counts). In this case, the score would be the sum of the centroid frequencies for hue columns (4,5), (13, 14) , (22,23), (31,32), (37,38). We can then examine how well this particular configuration of 5 hue pairs (corresponding to the infant novelty preferences) ranks against any of the 1287 possible combinations of 5 hue pairs, by computing the score of each of these configurations. To do so, we first computed the naming centroids over all 110 languages in the WCS, following Kay and Regier (2003) . We then explicitly computed the score for all 1287 possible combinations of 5 hue pairs, using the centroid counts along the stimulus row that we sampled from (row G). We found that only 4.27% of the 5 pair combinations (55/1287) resulted in a lower total centroid count than the 5 pairs which infants had novelty preferences for (i.e., more optimally captured hues that are not central to lexical categories).
Additionally, we used the peak centroid counts for each hue at any lightness level so that the centroid peaks seen in SI figure 3 are captured in the analysis. We found that only 3.26%
(42/1287) of the combinations resulted in a lower total centroid count than the 5 pairs which infants had novelty preferences for. For this peak centroid analysis, the best 5 pair combination that had the lowest centroid count included 4 of the 5 pairs for which infants showed a novelty preference, and only the blue-green pair differed (the best combination included the pair adjacent to and bluer than the blue-green pair for which infants showed a novelty preference). This analysis indicates that the color pairs which infants do not distinguish in recognition memory are not the smaller chromatic differences in adult perceptual color space which adults find more dissimilar than other pairs. However, one possibility is that infant perceptual color space at 4-6 months is different to that of adults (even in adults CIELAB is not perfectly uniform for large chromatic differences (53) . A difference in infant and adult perceptual color space would need to be radical to be able to account for the pattern of novelty preferences in our data since there was even no novelty preference for pairs with very large CIELAB differences. However, a radical difference between infants and adults is perhaps unexpected since infants are known to be trichromatic by at least 3-months (e.g., 34) mean adult isoluminance is a good approximation of infant isoluminance (54) and based on chromatic thresholds on protan, deutan and tritan axes their perceptual color space could be predicted to be similar to that of adults albeit with poorer sensitivity (34).
SI
